Crypto agile
Annual Reports Annual Reports Archived here you will find copies of the Senetas Corporation Limited annual and interim financial reports. Bringing Agility to Cryptography Cryptographic agility, however, is much more than simple performance statistics.
It comes from compatibility and interoperability, from FPGA-based flexibility and from the ability to support custom cryptographic agility elements. It even enables a choice of encryption algorithms and standards. Truly high-assurance encryption solutions are based on standards-based algorithms, typically AES or bit. An encryption platform should offer support for as many of these algorithms as possible.
Beyond encryption modes, agility should extend to support for other custom components, such as user-defined curves, external certificate authorities and sources of randomness. This is a key point of differentiation for Senetas customers, as it effectively future-proofs the technology. If, for example, NIST introduces a new quantum-resistant algorithm in the future; Senetas customers simply load the new algorithm to the system without interruption.
This helps to maintain a long-term return on investment and drives down the total cost of owning TCO Senetas hardware. Post-Quantum Cryptography Since the beginning of the 21st century, technology companies have been investing billions of dollars in the race to develop the first commercially viable quantum computer.
However, the quantum computer also poses an existential threat to encryption security as we know it today. It threatens the public key encryption infrastructure that underpins our global digital economy. In cryptography, the discovery of vulnerabilities and the retirement of algorithms is inevitable.
Organizations should adopt crypto-agility capabilities, or a stance in which encryption methods can be updated within protocols, systems and technology as vulnerabilities are discovered. Organizational Agility Agile cryptography requires the evolution of organizational policies prior to the discovery of vulnerabilities and risks. Gartner recommends the collaboration of security and incident response leadership to facilitate organizational change, including a three-part framework for transitioning to crypto-agility: Adapt application development and procurement workflows to reflect crypto-agility Conduct a comprehensive inventory of information systems which use cryptography.
Identify and evaluate algorithms in use Update incident response plans to include cryptographic alternatives and methods for updating existing methods of encryption Technological Agility Traditional response methods to the discovery of cryptographic vulnerabilities include time-consuming updates to code bases, algorithm replacement, application rebuilding, and patching. While this approach creates a solution, hard-coded changes do not facilitate protection or efficiency in future discovery of vulnerabilities.
Technological agility is best achieved with the adoption of new development frameworks and service software for applications that rely on strong cryptography. Development methods for crypto-agility could include the adoption of object-oriented frameworks such as Java Development Kit JDK and. These frameworks allow algorithms to be represented as classes that derive from abstract classes, which allow the loading of changes to algorithms post-implementation from a database or configuration file.
While new development frameworks can safeguard future applications, conducting a complete overhaul of legacy IT systems for intrinsic crypto-agility is not pragmatic. Crypto-agility can also be facilitated with the adoption of a service software layer, or gateway application, between applications and hardware security modules.
Solutions for cryptography as a service can enable agility in key management, policy enforcement, algorithm updates, monitoring, and usability. Achieving Crypto-Agility Organizations need the capacity to quickly update cryptographic methods without significant change to information systems to retain regulatory compliance and mitigate security risks.


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This is not only a lot of work for you, but it still leaves your users at risk until you can get the fixes shipped. A better alternative is to plan for this scenario from the beginning. Rather than hard-coding specific cryptographic algorithms into your code, use one of the crypto-agility features built into the Microsoft. NET Framework. Modifying this application to use a secure hashing algorithm would require changing code and issuing a patch. Configuration Manager class to retrieve a custom app setting the "md5Impl" setting from the application's configuration file.
In this case, the setting is used to store the strong name of the algorithm implementation class you want to use. The code passes the retrieved value of this setting to the static function MD5. Create to create an instance of the desired class. MD5 is an abstract base class from which all implementations of the MD5 algorithm must derive. For example, if the application setting for md5Impl was set to the string "System.
MD5Cng, System. Create would create an instance of the MD5Cng class. This approach solves only half of our crypto-agility problem, so it really is no solution at all. We can now specify an implementation of the MD5 algorithm without having to change any source code, which might prove useful if a flaw is discovered in a specific implementation, like MD5Cng, but we're still tied to the use of MD5 in general.
It looks like we've once again hard-coded the MD5 algorithm into the application via the call to HashAlgorithm. Create "MD5". Surprisingly though, this code is substantially more cryptographically agile than both of the other examples. While the default behavior of the method call HashAlgorithm. Create "MD5" —as of. NET 3. To do this, we need to add two elements to the machine.
Core, with the specified version, culture, and public key token and creates an instance of that class. It's important to note that the algorithm remapping takes place not at compile time but at run time: it's the user's machine. As a result, this technique solves our dilemma of being tied to a particular algorithm that might be broken at some time in the future. By avoiding hard-coding the cryptographic algorithm class into the application—coding only the abstract type of cryptographic algorithm, HashAlgorithm, instead—we create an application in which the end user more specifically, someone with administrative rights to edit the machine.
An administrator might choose to replace an algorithm that was recently broken with one still considered secure for example, replace MD5 with SHA or to proactively replace a secure algorithm with an alternative with a longer bit length replace SHA with SHA Potential Problems Modifying the machine.
Making changes to machine. NET application on the machine. Other applications installed on the machine might rely on MD5 specifically, and changing the algorithms used by these applications might break them in unexpected ways that are difficult to diagnose.
As an alternative to forcing blanket changes to the entire machine, it's better to use custom, application-specific friendly names in your code and map those name entries to preferred classes in the machine. You need to plan ahead regarding storage size, for both local variables transient storage and database and XML schemas persistent storage. For example, MD5 hashes are always bits in length.
If you budget exactly bits in your code or schema to store hash output, you will not be able to upgrade to SHA bit-length output or SHA bit-length output. This does beg the question of how much storage is enough. Is bits enough, or should you use 1,, 2,, or more? A public key certificate has cryptographic parameters including key type, key length, and a hash algorithm. However, as cryptographic algorithms are deployed, researching their security intensifies, and new attacks against cryptographic primitives old and new alike are discovered in short intervals.
Crypto-agility tries to tackle the implied threat to information security by allowing swift deprecation of vulnerable primitives and replacement by new ones. This threat is not merely theoretical; many algorithms that were once considered secure DES , bit RSA , RC4 are now known to be vulnerable, some even to amateur attackers.
On the other hand, new algorithms AES , Elliptic Curve Cryptography are often both more secure and faster in comparison to old ones. Systems designed to meet crypto-agility criteria are expected to be less affected should current primitives are found vulnerable, and may enjoy better latency or battery usage by using new and improved primitives.
As an example, quantum computing , if feasible, is expected to be able to defeat existing public key cryptography algorithms. The overwhelming majority of the existing public key infrastructure rely on the computational hardness of problems such as large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems which includes elliptic-curve cryptography as a special case. Quantum computers running Shor's algorithm can solve these problems exponentially faster than the best known algorithms for conventional computers.
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For example, if the application setting for md5Impl was set to the string "System. MD5Cng, System. Create would create an instance of the MD5Cng class. This approach solves only half of our crypto-agility problem, so it really is no solution at all.
We can now specify an implementation of the MD5 algorithm without having to change any source code, which might prove useful if a flaw is discovered in a specific implementation, like MD5Cng, but we're still tied to the use of MD5 in general.
It looks like we've once again hard-coded the MD5 algorithm into the application via the call to HashAlgorithm. Create "MD5". Surprisingly though, this code is substantially more cryptographically agile than both of the other examples. While the default behavior of the method call HashAlgorithm. Create "MD5" —as of. NET 3. To do this, we need to add two elements to the machine. Core, with the specified version, culture, and public key token and creates an instance of that class.
It's important to note that the algorithm remapping takes place not at compile time but at run time: it's the user's machine. As a result, this technique solves our dilemma of being tied to a particular algorithm that might be broken at some time in the future. By avoiding hard-coding the cryptographic algorithm class into the application—coding only the abstract type of cryptographic algorithm, HashAlgorithm, instead—we create an application in which the end user more specifically, someone with administrative rights to edit the machine.
An administrator might choose to replace an algorithm that was recently broken with one still considered secure for example, replace MD5 with SHA or to proactively replace a secure algorithm with an alternative with a longer bit length replace SHA with SHA Potential Problems Modifying the machine. Making changes to machine. NET application on the machine. Other applications installed on the machine might rely on MD5 specifically, and changing the algorithms used by these applications might break them in unexpected ways that are difficult to diagnose.
As an alternative to forcing blanket changes to the entire machine, it's better to use custom, application-specific friendly names in your code and map those name entries to preferred classes in the machine. You need to plan ahead regarding storage size, for both local variables transient storage and database and XML schemas persistent storage. For example, MD5 hashes are always bits in length. If you budget exactly bits in your code or schema to store hash output, you will not be able to upgrade to SHA bit-length output or SHA bit-length output.
This does beg the question of how much storage is enough. Is bits enough, or should you use 1,, 2,, or more? I can't provide a hard rule here because every application has different requirements, but as a rule of thumb I recommend that you budget twice as much space for hashes as you currently use. For symmetric- and asymmetric-encrypted data, you might reserve an extra 10 percent of space at most. It's unlikely that new algorithms with output sizes significantly larger than existing algorithms will be widely accepted.
However, applications that store hash values or encrypted data in a persistent state for example, in a database or file have bigger problems than reserving enough space. If you persist data using one algorithm and then try to operate on that data later using a different algorithm, you will not get the results you expect.
For example, it's a good idea to store hashes of passwords rather than the full plaintext versions. When the user tries to log on, the code can compare the hash of the password supplied by the user to the stored hash in the database. If the hashes match, the user is authentic.
However, if a hash is stored in one format say, MD5 and an application is upgraded to use another algorithm say, SHA , users will never be able to log on because the SHA hash value of the passwords will always be different from the MD5 hash value of those same passwords. You can get around this issue in some cases by storing the original algorithm as metadata along with the actual data. The overwhelming majority of the existing public key infrastructure rely on the computational hardness of problems such as large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems which includes elliptic-curve cryptography as a special case.
Quantum computers running Shor's algorithm can solve these problems exponentially faster than the best known algorithms for conventional computers. The main families of post-quantum alternatives to factoring and discrete logarithm include lattice-based cryptography , multivariate cryptography , hash-based cryptography and code-based cryptography.
Awareness[ edit ] System evolution and crypto-agility are not the same. System evolution progresses on the basis of emerging business and technical requirements. Crypto-agility is related instead to computing infrastructure and requires consideration by security experts, system designers and application developers.
Crypto-agility requirements must be disseminated to all hardware, software and service suppliers, who must comply on a timely basis; suppliers who cannot address these requirements must be replaced. Suppliers must provide timely updates and identify the crypto technology they employ.
Quantum-resistant solutions should be taken in mind.
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